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Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty, the Investment Policy of 
Levered Firms and Corporate Debt Yields 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper attempts to link the agency literature (concerned with the fact that tensions between 
bondholders and shareholders may trigger suboptimal investment decisions) with the one 
dealing with temporal resolution of uncertainty (TRU). We consider here how the speed of 
resolution of the uncertainty characterizing the firm's operations affects the risk-shifting 
behavior of a shareholder-aligned manager. It is assumed that investors are risk neutral and 
that the return on the risky technology is normally distributed. It is shown that the speed of 
TRU affects monotonically the extent of risk shifting as well as bond yields, even after optimal 
contracts mitigating deviations from the first-best investment policy have been written. In 
particular, the optimal investment-restricting covenant is endogenously characterized. 
Empirical implications are derived and discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
A relatively recent review of the work done in the field of corporate finance over the last twenty five years ends 
with the conclusion that one of the biggest challenges facing theorists and empiricists alike is the valuation of 
firms whose major asset consists of human rather than physical capital, prominent examples being in computer 
software and film production, [] for the paradigm example underlying most of our theoretical models is the 
manufacturing firm which dominated the growth of the economy around mid-century1. More generally the 
technologies used by firms have evolved, as the industry groups represented in the S&P500, ever more heavily 
weighted towards pharmaceutical, banking, media and technology firms, testify. In particular, we believe that 
alongside human capital, the speed at which uncertainty is resolved for those firms/industries has become a more 
important factor of their investment policy and the yield demanded on their debt. 
 
The relevance of the concept of temporal resolution of uncertainty (in the sequel: TRU) for corporate finance 
becomes intuitive as soon as one realizes that both sides of the balance sheet will depend heavily on it: the 
capital budgeting process will have to take into account whether more uncertainty affects short-term or long-term 
cash flows to figure out the right discount rates to use as well as the extent to which incoming information may 
change expectations about these cash flows. This will in turn determine the extent to which a firm can rely on 
debt as well as the type of debt it will use2. But the very nature of the firm's liabilities will affect its investment 
policy. This is certainly even more the case when we move from manufacturing firms to technology and human 
capital intensive firms, whose operations are not only arguably more risky, but also suffer from a more delayed 
resolution of uncertainty. 
 
Indeed, a large strand of the corporate finance literature has focused on so-called agency problems: an 
agent/manager may undertake actions that are suboptimal from the principal's point of view. This may be due to 
a difference in their respective utilities or their information sets and affects as well the level as the nature of the 
investment. For instance, a shareholder-aligned manager may decide not to undertake a valuable investment 
project because proceeds have to be shared with bondholders (especially in the states of nature where the firm is 
barely solvent) and decide to strategically default instead (see Myers (1977)). Alternatively, the manager may 
play on the riskiness of the firm's investments. She may invest in assets that are too risky (or even in negative-
NPV projects) to maximize the option value of equity (see for instance Jensen and Meckling (1976)) or, 
conversely, invest too conservatively. This would be the case if she is privately aware of growth options that 
would be lost in case of default (see Brito and John (2002)) or if she is not totally shareholder-aligned and is 
concerned about the loss of private benefits of control or reputation (especially if it is hard to tell whether a firm 
went bankrupt because of bad luck or bad management). However, the agency literature has focused on how 
                                                           
1 Brennan (1995), p.18. 
2 See Goswami, Noe and Rebello (1995) for an attempt to design the type of debt a firm should use depending on whether 
more uncertainty surrounds short-term or long-term cash flows. 
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these agency games vary depending on concrete characteristics of the firm (bankruptcy costs, debt-related tax 
shields, level of tangible assets etc.) in order to obtain testable empirical implications and has left the effect of 
some more abstract concepts, such as temporal resolution of uncertainty, a yet unresolved issue. 
 
On the other hand, the literature dealing with temporal resolution of uncertainty looks at the firm as a black box 
producing cash flows. For instance, the pioneering work by Epstein and Turnbull (1980) showed that when the 
uncertainty about a cash flow is resolved earlier (in the sense that more information is available about it at an 
intermediate date), the return demanded by investors who have a CARA utility function in an environment where 
returns are multivariate normal is larger than the riskless rate: the expected release of information has rendered 
the holdings risky. However, Epstein and Turnbulls discussion is restricted to studying the effect of temporal 
resolution of uncertainty on equilibrium market prices and on the optimal production of information. In their 
model, after the manager has conducted the experiment that yields some early resolution of uncertainty, the 
firm communicates the [result of the experiment] truthfully and no production decisions are taken after the 
experiment results become known (p. 628). They are aware that there may be a moral hazard in that actions by 
management may not be in the best interest of the owners and will decrease the market value of their holding 
and that the firm may release spurious information, but consider that insisting upon monitoring of managerial 
activities will minimize the associated costs.  
 
Nabar, Stapleton and Subrahmanyam (1988) took the issue into the realm of corporate finance by studying how 
the value of corporate debt (and hence its yield) is affected when the speed of uncertainty resolution varies. 
However, their model assumes a context in which the assets of the firm are in place and future risky investment 
decisions have already been taken by the firm (p. 224). As a consequence, Modigliani and Miller's (1958) 
Capital Structure Irrelevance Theorem still holds and hence the leverage employed by the firm merely 
determines the split of total value between debt and equity and not the total value of the firm itself (p. 225). 
Their model thus ignores agency problems and their effect on debt value and investment policy. 
 
There have been a couple of articles looking at agency problems under the light of temporal resolution of 
uncertainty (see John (1987) and John and Ronen (1990)). They present a relatively rigid framework (two 
possible outcomes for the investment project and a manager's information set consisting of only the probability 
of the high outcome and/or its magnitude) and thus can only offer the conclusion that the financing choices and 
the investment policy can be materially affected by the timing of financing and investment vis-à-vis crucial 
resolutions of uncertainty in the underlying technology3. In particular, the relation between the speed of 
resolution of uncertainty and corporate bond yields is not studied. More generally, we dont believe any research 
has been done that allows the pattern of TRU to evolve along a continuous range and derives empirical 
implications on investment policy and corporate debt yields in an asymmetric information/agency games 
framework. We set out to fill this gap.  
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We offer a model where managers not only know the probability of success or the magnitude of the final cash 
flows, but observe at an intermediate date a private signal, which gives them partial but richer information about 
the return on the risky technology in which they can invest. Outsiders only observe a noisy version of this signal 
and rely on it to enforce debt covenants, trying to limit the distortions between the actual investment policy 
chosen by the shareholder-aligned manager and the one that would maximize firm value. We endogenously 
characterize the optimal covenants mitigating these suboptimal investment choices. This will lead us to various 
empirical implications, explaining, at least partially, why leverage and corporate bond yields differ consistently 
across industries. 
 
The article is organized as follows: Section 2 posits the model and states the assumptions. Section 3 solves the 
problem, first when outsiders are not allowed to contract (or do not choose to), and then in the more general case 
when they can do so. We endogenously derive optimal covenants and when it is optimal to contract at all. 
Section 4 derives empirical implications and confronts them to the existing literature and Section 5 concludes. 
All proofs beyond the most trivial ones are relegated to the Appendix and numerical simulations and illustrating 
figures appear in the end. 
 
 
 
2. Model and Assumptions 
We consider here a three-date (t=0,1 or 2), two-period model4. The sequence of events is as follows: 
• At t=0, the entrepreneur, who owns the rights to a firm but does not have enough capital to finance it, sells 
claims consisting of debt and equity to outside investors. The debt is sold entirely to outsiders, while the 
entrepreneur may retain some of the equity or sell all of it5. In both cases, he has an incentive to maximize 
the combined value of both types of claims and therefore attaches to them firm-value-maximizing 
covenants. 
• At t=1, the manager of a firm with cash resources of I is faced with two possible investments: a riskless one, 
yielding the (gross) riskfree rate r2 (known at t=1) and a risky project that yields the (gross) stochastic rate θ. 
She makes her investment decision based on the observation of a private signal X1. This signal is assumed to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
3 John (1987), p. 638. 
4 This discrete finite-period model is used not only to retain parsimony and elegance in a multi-period model, but also to have 
more flexibility in the correlation structure of cash flows: using a continuous time diffusion-type process would force us into 
a situation where we could not distinguish between the pure correlation element ρ and the time element t t/ '  that enters 
the covariance between two cash flows happening at different points in time t and t', t<t. 
5 This insider contribution could be endogenized by trading off the reduction in contracting costs with the opportunity costs 
of supplying this capital, but we will abstain from it in this paper. 
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be bivariate normally distributed with the return available on the risky technology and hence gives some 
information to the manager about the probabilistic properties of the latter (we will denote ρm the correlation 
between X1 and θ). Based on the observation of a particular realization x1, the manager, a Bayesian decision 
maker, allocates her cash between the risky technology (in which she invests a fraction Q) and riskless 
Treasury bills in which she puts the remainder I-Q. At the time the manager observes the signal X1, 
outsiders observe a noisy version of it, Y1=X1+ε, where ε~ 2(0, )N εσ  is white noise, independent of X1 and 
θ; we will denote ρb the correlation between Y1 and θ). 
• At t=2, the realization of the risky technology θ is revealed to everybody and the firm is liquidated (proceeds 
are distributed according to the prewritten financial agreement). 
 
The signal X1 could be the result of a performance test on a prototype or a marketing survey; alternatively, it 
could be a t=1 cash flow, but we would have to impose the restriction that it is not contractible upon (or at least 
not verifiable by an outside court). We further assume that dividends are not allowed, in which case the 
shareholder-aligned manager would distribute as much as possible at t=1. Contracts can only be written (and 
enforced) based on the realization y1 of the noisy signal Y1, observable by everybody, not based on the 
realization x1 of the more precise signal X1, observed only by the manager. This asymmetry of information is at 
the heart of the agency problem and creates a problem of incomplete contracting in relation to the managers 
investment choices. Our model can be summarized schematically as in Figure 1. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
 Temporal resolution of uncertainty is defined in much the same way as in Epstein and Turnbull (1980): we 
say that the more (less) informative the experiment concerning the final cash flows is, the earlier (later) the prior 
uncertainty about cash flows is resolved. Epstein and Turnbull (1980) show that in the case of jointly normal 
distributions, the correlation coefficient is a sufficient statistic for the informativeness of the experiment: an 
experiment X is said to be more informative about θ than about θ if corr(X,θ)≥corr(X,θ). This role of ρ is best 
seen if we consider the proportion of the uncertainty of θ that is resolved by observing X1 or Y1: 
2
11 var( | ) / var( ) mXθ θ ρ− =  and 211 var( | ) / var( ) bYθ θ ρ− = . Hence, we shall say that there is earlier resolution of 
uncertainty the larger (in absolute value) ρ, the correlation coefficient between the signal observed and θ. 
 
In other words, if ρ is large, there is little more to be learnt at t=2 and most of the uncertainty has indeed been 
resolved in the first period. If ρ is low, most of the uncertainty is shifted towards the second period. We will 
consider only positive values of ρ, since we look at it as the correlation coefficient between θ and a random 
variable that is perfectly correlated to the signal and which tells you how informative this signal is about θ (for 
instance, a signal that has, say, a -0.9 correlation with θ would be extremely informative; in our model, this case 
would be summarized with ρ=0.9).  
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We need here to clarify a few assumptions of our model: 
 
• Assumption 1: Investors are risk-neutral. This stems either from the absence of arbitrage (ensuring the 
existence of a risk-neutral measure), or from the combination of certain preferences and distribution 
properties for the underlying variables6. As a consequence, the firms securities are priced on the basis of the 
relevant conditional expectation of the cash flows (with respect to the state price density function). 
• Assumption 2: The firm has two types of marketed claims outstanding, debt and equity. The debt has the 
form of a pure discount bond of promised payment F which matures at t=2. Note that since the return on the 
investment is normally distributed, it has a positive probability of being arbitrarily negative and therefore 
any amount of outstanding debt is risky. Once the final cash flow is realized, the firm is obliged to pay debt 
claims, if possible. If the cash flow is insufficient to meet debt obligations, the firm goes bankrupt and its 
assets are turned over to bondholders. We will abstain from considering bankruptcy costs or the tax 
advantage of debt financing. 
• Assumption 3: It is not possible for the manager to issue further debt at t=1 after observing the result of the 
experiment, nor is it allowed to invest a negative amount in the risky project, putting the proceeds in the 
riskfree asset (short-selling the risky project). We also assume that E(θ)>r2. 
• Assumption 4: The information available to the manager at t=1 is restricted to a signal X17.  
• Assumption 5: The manager acts to maximize the wealth of current shareholders (i.e., under asymmetric 
information, the true value of their claims conditional on the private information). In a rational expectations 
equilibrium, debtholders as well as stockholders will correctly anticipate, at t=0, the effect of debt structure 
and temporal resolution of uncertainty on the chosen investment strategy and the effect of this strategy on 
security pricing; in consequence, the entrepreneur bears the agency costs of debt when he sells securities at 
t=0. Note here that we implicitly assume that outsiders have all the information about the firms 
characteristics (in particular about the firms investment opportunity set) and insiders preferences (insiders 
optimal private actions are common knowledge), which is necessary for them to rationally price their 
claims. 
 
                                                          
6 Stapleton and Subrahmanyam (1984) show that in a discrete time framework, the combinations of negative exponential 
(CARA) utilities and normally distributed variables, or power (CRRA or HARA) utilities and lognormally distributed 
variables, yield a risk-neutral valuation relationship (RNVR) after a shift of the original parameters. In our model, the reader 
can consider that we look at the case where investors display constant absolute risk-aversion and returns are normal, but that 
all results are derived with parameters already shifted in such a way as to be able to use the tools of risk-neutral valuation. 
See also Ross (1978) for why we do not lose any generality assuming risk neutrality if markets are reasonably complete. 
7 If one wants to relax this assumption, then all we need to assume is that if there were two different projects yielding θ and 
θ respectively, all elements of the t=1 information set Φ1 apart from X1 are equally informative about θ and θ. 
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A few comments on those assumptions are necessary. Assumption 2 may not be as innocuous as it seems. In our 
model, the outcome of the risky project may be arbitrarily negative. Since in the United States (as in most 
developed countries) equity has limited liability, we have to introduce a third claim. This claim is a purely 
negative one, borne by the government: if the firm faces hard times (i.e. a negative realization of θ), the 
government steps in to absorb the negative result (as, for instance, in the case of an environmental catastrophe 
where the state has to bear the cleanup costs)8. We will refer to the combined value of debt and equity as the 
market value of the firm since this is the amount for which the firm can be sold to the public at t=0. If we add 
to this the negative claim, we'll refer to it as the social value of the firm. 
 
Assumption 3 tells us that the firm chooses to issue outside claims (debt in our case) when it is common 
knowledge that there is no asymmetric information between the manager of the firm and outsiders. It is not clear 
whether it would be possible at all to issue further debt (no matter at what rate), when asymmetric information 
may lead to a lemons problem (see Akerlof (1970)). This is an issue we are considering in a companion paper. 
 
Finally, Assumption 5 clarifies what is known by everybody and what is private information: apart from the 
realization x1 that only the manager observes, everything else is publicly known; in particular: ρm, the speed of 
resolution of uncertainty for the particular firm/industry, E(θ), Var(θ), E(X1), Var(X1) and all other parameters, 
as well as the preferences of the manager, the firm's characteristics and the fact that the manager privately 
observes x1, thus enabling bondholders to rationally price their claim. All other assumptions are standard and do 
not affect crucially our results. 
 
The problem here is threefold. First of all, we would like to determine to what extent the informativeness of the 
signal observed by the manager before making the investment decision will affect her deviation from the optimal 
investment policy. Secondly, we set out to endogenously characterize the optimal contracts to limit such 
deviations. And finally, the resulting yield premium demanded on corporate debt has to be evaluated. 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 Alternatively, this third claim could be an insurance policy for which the firm would have to pay a premium upfront. This 
complicates the model unduly, so we'll assume that the government steps in in case of a negative final cash flow but ensure in 
choosing our simulation parameters that the probability of this event happening is arbitrarily small. 
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3. Solving the Problem 
3.1. Some Preliminary Results 
In the framework outlined above, it can be shown that the signal observed by outsiders at t=1 (defined as X1 plus 
white noise) is also bivariate normally distributed with the outcome of the risky technology, although it is less 
informative about θ than X1: 
 
Proposition 1: Y1 and θ are bivariate normal random variables with correlation coefficient 
b m XYρ ρ ρ= where ρXY is the correlation coefficient between X1 and Y1 (strictness of disclosure 
requirements) and ρm is the correlation coefficient between X1 and θ (informativeness of 
managers signal). 
 
Proof: 1
1 1 1
1 1cov( , ) cov( , ) X
b m
Y Y Y
Y X
θ θ
σθ θ ερ ρ
σ σ σ σ σ
+
≡ = = . Since 1
1 1 1
1 1cov( , ) X
XY
X Y Y
X X σερ
σ σ σ
+
= = , b m XYρ ρ ρ= .   
 
Since 
1
2 2 2
1 1var( | ) (1 )Y XYY X εσ σ ρ= ≡ − , Y1 is a more noisy estimate of X1 (larger σε) if and only if ρXY is smaller. 
It becomes in turn a less reliable predictor of θ (smaller ρb) and leaves outsiders with a higher residual 
uncertainty 
1
2 2 2
| (1 )Y bθ θσ σ ρ= − . Hence, the larger 2 2m bρ ρ−  and 2εσ or the smaller ρXY, the larger the extent of 
asymmetric information. In the sequel, well mainly do comparative statics with respect to ρXY, since we have a 
more intuitive feeling for it (see next paragraph), and since it does not need to be scaled (as opposed to εσ ). 
 
A useful way to think about it is as follows: ρm is the informativeness of the managers signal and is the true 
speed of temporal resolution of uncertainty in a given firm/industry/market. It therefore gives us inter-
industry/market comparative statics (once we have controlled for the intrinsic project risk σθ). However, within a 
given industry/market, disclosure requirements vary (due to size differences or the stock exchange on which a 
stock is traded) and therefore outsiders will be more or less able to monitor actions by insiders. Typically, large 
firms listed on the NYSE will have stricter disclosure requirements (larger ρXY) than smaller firms listed on the 
NASDAQ, leaving outsiders with a higher signal precision ρb9. This ρb cannot, however, be seen as a measure 
                                                           
9 The term disclosure requirements encompasses only the verifiable information the manager releases. Big firms will 
probably enjoy fewer information asymmetries because more analysts follow them rather than due to significant differences 
in disclosure requirements between, say, the NYSE and the NASDAQ markets. Alternatively, our problem can be seen as 
looking at different firms within the same industry, but differing along two dimensions: the speed at which the uncertainty 
surrounding their operations is resolved (as measured by ρm) and the extent of information asymmetry between insiders and 
outsiders (measured by ρXY). 
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of the speed at which uncertainty is resolved, since it is the correlation coefficient between the return on the risky 
technology θ and a signal which can be more or less noisy irrespective of the industry (or firm) considered; ρb 
thus measures the speed of resolution of uncertainty tainted by asymmetric information. Outsiders, who know 
the value of ρm (but do not observe x1), are aware that the ρb based on which they will make decisions is only the 
product of ρm and ρXY and compute true values for financial claims using ρm (which is common knowledge). In 
order to later understand the general solution to the problem, as well as notations, we will now present the case 
where ρXY=0. This corresponds to the case where outsiders are fed no information whatsoever (or an infinitely 
noisy, therefore irrelevant, information). We'll assume that outsiders do not write any contract ex-ante and will 
show in a later section, when we look at the general case, that they would not even if they could: contracting is 
suboptimal when the extent of asymmetric information is too large. 
 
 
3.2. Example: the Opaque Firm 
3.2.1. The Firms Investment Policy 
At t=1, the manager of a levered firm, subject to a managerial contract that perfectly aligns her incentives with 
shareholder interests, will seek to 
{ }2 1 1[0, ]
2
1max ( ) |
Q I
E Q I Q r F X x
r
θ +
∈
 + − − =
 
 
where (w)+ stands for max(w,0). For an all-equity firm, the face value of the debt F has to be replaced by zero, in 
which case the objective function above represents the firm-value maximizing (first-best) investment policy.  
More generally, the payoff to the shareholders is positive if and only if Qθ+(I-Q)r2>F or θ≥[F-(I-Q)r2]/Q≡θ* 
(note here the circularity of the problem: θ* will determine the shareholders optimal Q, but Q enters the formula 
for θ*). If the manager chooses to invest very little money in the risky technology (Q tends to 0), two possible 
cases arise: i) if Ir2≥F, θ* tends to -∞: the firm will be solvent in all states of nature since its final wealth will be 
Ir2, which is enough to cover its debt obligation of F; ii) if Ir2<F, θ* tends to +∞: the firm will never be solvent 
since its final wealth, Ir2, is insufficient to cover its debt obligation. Since no bank or individual would lend 
money with a face value greater than Ir2 to our firm (which, in order to be solvent, would have to invest a 
positive Q in the risky technology, no matter how negative x1 is, since investing in the risky technology is the 
only way to have a positive probability of avoiding bankruptcy), we shall assume that F≤Ir2. The fact that θ* 
increases with F reflects the fact that as the amount of promised debt increases, the range of states where the 
firm defaults, (-∞,θ*], expands10. 
 
The problem then becomes, denoting P(θ|X1) the probability distribution function of θ conditional on X1,  
                                                           
10 We call state of the world a particular x1 if we are sitting at time 1, a particular θ or more generally a particular couple 
(x1, θ) if we are sitting at t=2. 
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[ ]
*
2 1 1[0, ] [0, ]
max ( ) ( | ) max ( , , , )mQ I Q IQ I Q r F dP X U Q x F
θ
θ θ ρ
∞
∈ ∈
+ − − ⇔ ,  (1) 
where we have underscored the dependence of this indirect utility function on ρm and the particular realization x1 
observed at t=1. It is shown in Appendix 1 that this is equivalent to maximizing the following expression over 
Q∈[0,I]: 
[ ]
1 11 1 1 2 1 1
( , , , ) ( | ) ( ) ( ) var( | ) ( )m x xU Q x F QE X x I Q r F B Q X x Bρ θ θ ϕ= = + − − Φ + =  (2) 
where 
1
*
1 1
1 1
( | )
var( | )x
E X xB
X x
θ θ
θ
= −
≡
=
 and Φ and ϕ denote the standard normal cumulative probability function and 
density function respectively. 
 
The expression (2) is the expected value as of t=1 of the cash flows to be received by shareholders at t=2. It has 
to be discounted at the riskless rate r2 to yield the share price at t=1, as a function of the quantity invested Q, the 
particular state of the world x1 and the particular pattern of resolution of uncertainty (ρm shows up as well in 
E(θ|X1=x1) as in var(θ|X1=x1)). Expression (2) can be interpreted as follows: the first term tells us that the 
shareholders get whatever is left of the cash flows to the firm after bondholders have been repaid if the firm is 
solvent (which happens with a probability of 
1
( )xBΦ ); the second term tells us that shareholders should be 
concerned not only with whether they finish in-the-money, but by how much (the firm is now long an asset 
that bears a normal return and thus has to deal with this convexity feature). 
 
It is shown in Appendix 1 that the function U(Q,ρm,x1,F) is convex, leading to a corner solution. Whether Q=0 or 
Q=I will depend on the particular x1 observed by the manager: since 
1
1, 0
lim ( , , , ) /mx Q U Q x F Qρ→−∞ → ∂ ∂ = −∞ , 
investing everything in riskless bills may yield a higher value for the objective function for low values of x1. We 
now characterize the managers investment policy. 
 
3.2.2. Characterizing the Shareholder-Aligned Manager's Risk-Shifting Incentives 
A risk-shifting (overinvestment) region is defined as a range of x1 values for which a levered firm will invest in 
the risky venture whereas an all-equity firm will prefer to put the money into riskless bills, i.e. values of x1 for 
which U(I,ρm,x1,F)>U(0,ρm,x1,F) whereas U(I,ρm,x1,0) ≤U(0,ρm,x1,0). The first task is to characterize the values 
of x1 for which the firm decides to invest in the risky technology: 
 
Lemma 1: Given a certain pattern of temporal resolution of uncertainty ρm, there exists a unique cutoff 
value 01X  (resp. 1
FX ) above which the manager of an all-equity (resp. levered) firm will invest 
in the risky technology. 
 
Proof: see Appendix 2. 
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For the sake of clarity, we will refer to a managerial policy investing in the risky technology for all 1 1
Fx X≥  as 
investment policy 1[ ]
FX . Note that the investment policy 01[ ]X  is the one that could have been achieved if the 
realization x1 had been perfectly observed by all parties and if a complete set of enforceable contracts specifying 
any investment policy could have been written.  
 
Consistent with the extensive literature on agency games, it can be shown that the larger the amount of debt 
outstanding, the lower the investment cutoff 1
FX  (i.e. the larger the x1-region 1[ , ]
FX ∞  over which the firm 
decides to invest). In particular, a levered firm will never invest less than an all-equity one in the sense that the 
x1-range that triggers investment by the levered firm contains the one that triggers investment by the all-equity 
firm. We therefore decide to call the quantity 01 1
FX X−  the extent of risk-shifting, since it characterizes the 
region where signals are too low for the manager of an all-equity firm to invest, while the manager of a levered 
firm still chooses the risky technology. We summarize these different results in the following lemma:  
 
Lemma 2: i) For a given ρm, the manager of a levered firm will overinvest compared to the manager of an 
all-equity firm in the sense that 01 1
FX X< ; as a consequence, the investment policy 1[ ]
FX  
gives rise to a t=2 cash flow distribution that is riskier, in the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970, 
1971) sense, than the t=2 cash flow distribution from the investment policy 01[ ]X . 
 ii) The ex-ante probability of investing in the risky technology is increasing in the amount of 
outstanding debt F; in particular, it is greater for a levered firm than for an all-equity one. 
 iii) The extent of risk shifting is strictly increasing in the face value F of the firm's debt. Hence, 
the terminal cash flow distribution resulting from the investment policy 1[ ]
FX  is strictly riskier 
the larger F. 
 
Proof:  i) see Appendix 2 for a proof that the investment cutoff 1
FX  is decreasing in F. In particular, 
0
1 1
FX X<  for any positive amount of debt F. It then suffices to notice that over the range 
0
1 1[ , ]
FX X , a strictly larger quantity will be invested in the risky technology by the levered 
firm, raising the variance of the final cash flows (while for any 01 1 1[ , ]
Fx X X∈ , 
0
1 1 1 1[ | ] [ | ]E X x E X Xθ θ= < = ). 
 ii) The ex-ante (t=0) probability that a firm with an investment policy 1[ ]
FX  will invest is 
11 1
1 (( ) / )F XX X σ−Φ − , which is increasing in F since 1
FX  is decreasing in F.  
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 iii) Since 01X  doesnt depend on F, the quantity 
0
1 1
FX X− , previously shown to be positive for 
any positive F, is therefore increasing in F. The lower cutoff value 1
FX  resulting from an 
increase in the amount of outstanding debt yields the added risk to the distribution of terminal 
cash flows.  
 
Figure 2 gives a quick synopsis of the situation. As more debt is issued (i.e. as the probability of insolvency 
looms larger), the investment cutoff for the levered firm moves to the left, yielding a larger investment region 
1[ , )
FX ∞ ; in particular, the risk-shifting region 01 1[ , ]
FX X  widens: the incentive to increase the risk of the firm 
becomes more acute.  
 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
3.2.3. Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty and Risk-Shifting Incentives 
Our model therefore confirms that the distortion in the investment policy of a shareholder-aligned manager 
becomes more pronounced as the amount of debt outstanding increases. However, a far more interesting task is 
to find out how risk-shifting incentives vary with the pattern of temporal resolution of uncertainty ρm. Several 
results will be proven here. 
 
Theorem 1:  i) The cutoffs 01X  and 1
FX  are strictly increasing in ρm. 
 ii) As a result, the risk of the firm's terminal cash flow distribution and the probability of 
investing in the risky technology are decreasing in ρm,  
 
Proof: see Appendix 3 for a proof of i). As for ii), it follows directly from Lemma 2: if a larger ρm triggers a 
higher cutoff value 01X  (resp. 1
FX ), then distribution of the terminal cash flows resulting from 
the investment policy 01[ ]X  (resp. 1[ ]
FX ) implemented by the manager is strictly less risky 
and the probability of investing, 
11 1
1 (( ) / )F XX X σ−Φ − , is lower. 
 
This yields our first directly testable implication: firms operating in industries where uncertainty is resolved later 
will have more risky operations. Even when the intrinsic risk of a project (σθ) is held constant (i.e. comparing 
two firms in the same industry), the firm for which uncertainty is resolved later will invest over a larger X1-
region than the firm for which uncertainty is resolved earlier. Hence, if a given firm decides to invest for a 
certain value of x1, so will a firm facing more delayed uncertainty. This effect is independent of the fact that 
firms with later temporal resolution of uncertainty (lower ρm) may typically rely more on growth projects, 
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developing a new drug or software, with the risk that a competitor achieves it before them or that a regulatory 
agency prevents them from selling their product (shift in σθ). 
 
Heuristically, this is due to the fact that when ρm is small, X1 is less reliable in forecasting θ; hence the manager 
is ready to take the risk of investing in the risky project even for relatively low values of x1, aware that the end 
result may still turn out to be very decent. The extent of the Bayesian update is small and the manager beliefs 
are close to the prior ones, which would lead her to invest (E(θ)>r2). On the contrary, when ρm is larger, X1 is 
more reliable in forecasting θ and a bad signal x1 is a pretty good indication that the final outcome will be 
mediocre (the extent of the Bayesian update is larger). 
 
It is interesting to notice that our result is not purely driven by the fact that the manager is faced with lower 
residual uncertainty 2 2(1 )mθσ ρ−  when ρm gets larger. The investment cutoffs 01X  and 1FX  are not monotonic in 
σθ (see first simulation)! The reason is that σθ enters E(θ|X1) as well. When x1 is mediocre, i.e. in a region where 
it is not obvious whether the manager should invest or not, i.e. 1 1x X<  but x1 is not too negative (we prove in 
Appendix 3 that both 01X  and 1FX  are negative), a larger σθ decreases E(θ|X1=x1), but at the same time fattens 
the distribution of θ conditional on x1, therefore increasing the upside potential gains (upper tail of the 
distribution11). The investment cutoff is increasing in σθ for lower values of σθ (the larger ex-ante uncertainty 
mainly lowers E(θ|X1=x1) and results in less frequent investment). However over larger values of σθ, the 
potential gains over the (fatter) upper tail of the conditional density of θ outweigh the decrease in E(θ|X1=x1), 
yielding an investment cutoff that is decreasing in σθ: the likelihood that the manager will invest in the risky 
technology is increasing in the ex-ante uncertainty. This is especially true for larger amounts of debt since the 
cutoff 1
FX  is implicitly defined as 1 1 2[max( , / ) | ]
FE F I X X rθ = = . The larger F, the larger the proportion of the 
distribution of 1( | )
FE Xθ  that is discarded (lower tail) because of limited liability, and the larger the expectation 
over the remaining part of the truncated distribution. 
 
The conclusion is different for a move in ρm. When ρm increases, it not only lowers the conditional expectation 
E(θ|X1=x1) for mediocre x1s, it also makes the conditional distribution of θ tighter around this lower 
expectation: the manager is certainly less likely to invest when the signal is reliable and bad, with no upside 
potential. On the contrary, a lower value of ρm will both increase the conditional expectation E(θ|X1=x1) and the 
upside potential (fatter upper tail). Hence, given a certain ρm and σθ, a borderline x1 will be unacceptable if we 
increase ρm but under some circumstances may be acceptable for a lower - or larger - σθ. We summarize the 
above discussion in Figure 3, but refer the reader to Epstein (1980) for more on why a larger ex-ante variance of 
                                                          
11 The shareholder-aligned manager does not care about the lower tail because of limited liability. 
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the distribution of final cash flows and a more delayed resolution of uncertainty do not always yield the same 
qualitative results. 
 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
 
The previous result holds for all-equity as well as levered firms. It turns out that it holds for the extent of debt-
induced risk-shifting (the difference between 01X  and 1
FX , both of which increase with ρm) as well: 
 
Theorem 2: The extent of risk shifting 01 1
FX X−  is strictly decreasing in the pattern of TRU ρm. 
 
Proof: see Appendix 4. 
 
Note that our results are consistent with the existing research predicting that companies whose value consists 
primarily of growth options as opposed to assets in place are likely to find debt financing very costly 
(Myers (1977), p. 161). Intuitively assets in place are more numerous in industries where uncertainty is 
resolved earlier. This paper, however, explicitly uncovers the functional dependence between the pattern of 
temporal resolution of uncertainty and the investment policy distortions.  
 
It is worth noting that the extent of risk-shifting is continuous as ρm tends to 1: observing x1 fully reveals θ and 
whether the firm is levered or not, the risky project will be chosen if and only if 
( )
11 1 1 2
( ) / Xx x X rθθ θ σ σ≡ + − ≥ ; any lower realization x1, and the manager is better off investing in riskless 
bonds, securing a payoff of Ir2-F for shareholders. However, this feature of continuity does not hold when ρm 
tends to 0. When ρm=0, X1 is irrelevant in forecasting θ and the managers of both the all-equity and the levered 
firm make a decision based on the unconditional mean, E(θ)>r2, and invest in the risky venture regardless of the 
particular realization x1: there is no risk shifting. However, when ρm tends to 0, it is easily shown that the extent 
of risk shifting tends to infinity. Hence, there is a discontinuity in the extent of risk shifting in ρm=0.  
 
However, this does not have any impact on agency costs for two reasons: i) both 01X  and 1
FX  tend to -∞ as ρm 
approaches 0 and for all relevant purposes we can consider that both managers have the same investment policy 
(investing for all x1's). It may be of more relevance to consider the probability of falling in this region, 
1 1
0
1 1(( ) / ) (( ) / )
F
X XX X X Xσ σΦ − −Φ − , which indeed tends to 0; ii) when ρm is very low, X1 is of very little 
relevance for predicting θ and even a significant distortion between the two investment policies would not yield 
significant ex-ante agency costs (formally, 
11 1 1 1
( | ) ( ) /m XE X x x Xθθ θ ρ σ σ= = + − , and even if 1 1x X−  is very 
negative, E(θ|X1=x1) will be close to E(θ) for very low ρm).  
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More generally, agency costs assume a bell-shaped curve as a function of ρm, with very low agency costs for ρm 
close to 0 (see explanation above) and for ρm close to 1 (because of the absence of investment distortion for large 
values of ρm). The largest agency costs are achieved for intermediate values of ρm, where the extent of risk-
shifting is smaller than for lower values of ρm but causes much more harm since a mediocre x1 is a more reliable 
signal that the final realization of θ will indeed be poor. For I=100, r2=5%, E(θ)=15%, and σθ=0.6 (our standard 
scenario), agency costs represent up to 0.23% of firm value for F=50 (market value of debt/equity ratio: 0.675) 
and 1.16% for F=75 (market value of D/E ratio: 1.375). This is consistent with Leland (1998), who finds agency 
costs ranging from 0.32% to 1.22% of firm value depending on the risk management policy of the firm. The 
reason why the magnitude of agency costs is modest is that managers do not observe, as opposed to previous 
studies, any future parameter (e.g. future cash flows in case of success), but a signal that give them some partial 
information about future cash flows. Hence i) the magnitude of the asymmetric information is much smaller, and 
ii) if the policy conducted by the manager is much different from the one value-maximizers would choose, it 
does not ensure in any way that the final outcome of θ will make this deviation of consequence. Our agency 
costs are also rendered smaller by the fact that we do not consider the costs of financial distress (not only 
bankruptcy costs but also the impossibility to react freely to strategic moves by competitors if the firm is in the 
process of reorganization). 
 
3.2.4. Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty and Corporate Debt Yields 
Aware that the distribution of terminal cash flows will be less risky (Theorem 1) and that the extent of risk-
shifting will be lower (Theorem 2), rational bondholders will demand a lower yield (or, equivalently, pay a 
larger price) for the bonds of a firm operating in a field where uncertainty is resolved earlier. We prove this in 
Appendix 5, after computing the t=0 value of bonds: 
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
2 1/21
0 1 1
1 2
1( , , ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
F
F
F
m m x x x x x x
X X
X XB F X F I A A A C C C dP x
r r θ
ρ σ ρ ϕ ϕ
σ
∞  
− 
 = Φ + − Φ + − Φ − 	
   	
   
  
where 
1xC  stands for the function [ ] 11 1 |( | ) / / XE X x F I θθ σ= −  (it is nothing else than the earlier function 
1xB when Q=I), 1 1 1 11 1 | |( | ) / /( )x X x XA E X x C F Iθ θθ σ σ= = = +  and r1 denotes the discount rate to be used from t=0 
to t=1 (we would not lose any generality assuming that it is equal to 0).  
 
Theorem 3: The equilibrium prices of corporate bonds are increasing in ρm, the pattern of temporal 
resolution of uncertainty. Equivalently, the risk premium demanded on corporate bonds is 
decreasing in ρm. 
 
Note that this stems from two effects:  
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i) As ρm increases, so does the firm's market value because to the manager carrying out her 
investment policy based on a more reliable information12. Bondholders share this benefit with 
shareholders (total firm value effect); 
ii) as ρm increases, the extent of risk-shifting decreases (see Theorem 2), and bondholders benefit 
from a lower deviation from the socially optimal investment policy (reduction in agency games 
effect). 
 
Bondholders will demand lower bond yields from a firm with earlier resolution of uncertainty both because of a 
lower residual risk at the time of the investment decision (total firm value effect) and because the manager will 
depart less from the value-maximizing investment policy. Both reasons follow from a later resolution of 
uncertainty. It however remains an open question whether TRU still has some power explaining the cross-
sectional variation in yields demanded on corporate bonds, once risk (default risk as well as overall business 
risk) has been controlled for. A recent empirical investigation by Reisz and Perlich (1999) answers positively, 
with statistical as well as economic significance. This confirms the results of our simulations: keeping the 
business risk constant at σθ=0.6 and setting I=100, r2=5% and E(θ)=15%, the yield premium is as large as 383 
basis points for F=50 (market debt/equity ratio of 0.675) and 628 basis points for F=75 (market D/E ratio of 
1.375). This is consistent with Leland (1998) and Duffie, Schroder and Skiadas (1996) for instance. 
 
So far, outsiders were not allowed to contract. An unfortunate feature of our model is then that ρm measures as 
well the pattern of resolution of uncertainty as the extent of asymmetric information the manager enjoys at t=1 
(how reliable the x1 observed only by her is). Now, it is interesting to note that the temporal resolution of 
                                                           
12 Following the same procedure as in the computation of bond prices, one can show that the levered firm's t=0 market value 
(value of debt + value of equity) is:  
1 1 1
1 1
2 1/ 21
0 1 2 1
1 2
( , , ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )
F
F
F
m m x x x
X X
I X XV F X r A A A dP x
r r θ
ρ σ ρ ϕ
σ
∞  
− 
 = Φ + − Φ + 	
   	
   
  
Totally differentiating this expression with respect to ρm (which appears directly as well as indirectly through X1F) yields a 
positive result (this differentiation is similar to the one in Appendix 5). One can see 0 1( , , ) / 0
F
m mV F Xρ ρ∂ ∂ >  as the marginal 
increase in firm value that the choice by a marginally more informed the manager will bring (marginal value of information). 
If our model allowed the manager to buy more information for a certain cost, this increase in marginal value would have to be 
equated to the marginal cost of buying more information to find the optimal level of information. 
Finally, since firm value is increasing in ρm, it is bounded below by 00 1 0 1 1 2(0, , ) (0,0, ) [max( ,0)]/FV F X V X IE r rθ= = =  
1 2 1 2( / ) ( / ) / /I r r I r rθ θ θθ θ σ σ ϕ θ σ θ Φ + >  , this last number being the social value of the firm for ρm=0. Since in our model 
E(θ)>r2, this lower bound for the firm's value is strictly greater than I/r1, the t=0 present value of the I dollars invested at t=1. 
The difference can be seen as the growth options of the firm (value of the opportunity to invest in a technology with 
E(θ)>r2). Alternatively, it can be seen as the surplus of the entrepreneur when he sells the firm to outside shareholders and 
bondholders at t=0. 
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uncertainty effect overwhelms any opposite asymmetric information effect: if ρm represented only the extent of 
the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders, rational bondholders would demand a larger yield for 
a larger ρm. Disentangling the two roles of ρm (TRU and information asymmetry) would hence not change the 
qualitative nature of our results. This is what we prove in the next section, where we allow outsiders to contract 
so as to mitigate the extent of risk-shifting.  
 
 
3.3. The General Case: Outsiders Contract Optimally 
3.3.1. Designing the Optimal Contractual Terms 
In the more general case where outsiders observe as of t=1 a meaningful signal Y1, it is in the entrepreneur's 
interest to write covenants as of t=0 when he sells claims to the firm's cash flows. Since he is the one who will 
bear the ex-ante agency costs of debt as he sells financial claims, his goal is to maximize the sale price of bonds 
plus the value of the equity he keeps. This is equivalent to saying that he will try to minimize the t=1 deviation 
from the firm value maximizing investment policy. 
 
Since an investment policy can only be enforced based on verifiable information, outsiders will want to 
{ }2 1 1[0, ]
2
1max ( ) |
Q I
E Q I Q r Y y
r
θ +
∈
 + − =
 
 at t=1. This is achieved by investing in the risky technology if and only if 
0
1 1y Y>  defined, as in the previous section, by: 
0 0
1 1( , , ,0) (0, , ,0)b bU I Y U Yρ ρ= : at 01 1y Y= , the firm as a whole 
is indifferent between investing in the risky technology or in riskless bonds. However, the decision is made here 
based on the observation of the signal Y1, i.e. using the parameters ρb=ρXYρm<ρm and 1 1
2 2 2
Y X εσ σ σ= +  instead of 
ρm and 1
2
Xσ . Since the cutoff value is increasing in ρ (Theorem 1) and decreasing in the variance of the signal 
(i.e. 
1Xσ  for 
0
1X , 1Yσ  for 
0
1Y ; see proof at the end of Appendix 3), 
0 0
1 1Y X< : the presence of the noise ε makes 
perfect contracting (i.e. enforcing the first-best investment policy) not possible. 
 
The problem now is to figure out the terms of the bond covenants. Contracts based on ex-post realizations are 
assumed to be ruled out by legal structures. Since 0 01 10 0lim limXY m
Y X
ρ ρ→ →
= = −∞ , forcing the manager to invest in the 
risky project if 01 1y Y>  may in certain cases (i.e. for low values of ρXY) add very little value or even be counter-
productive, creating new agency costs13. At first sight, the following contract could be written at t=0: 
 
                                                           
13 This is similar to Myers' (1977) framework, where enforcing a minimum level of investment may create new agency costs 
due to forced investment in negative NPV states.  
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• if 01 1
FY X≥ , impose an investment cutoff of 01Y : if 
0
1 1y Y≤ , the manager will have to invest in 
riskless bonds and if 01 1y Y> , the risky technology will be chosen. 
• if 01 1
FY X< , bondholders will let the shareholder-aligned manager do as she pleases. 
 
However, the same result can be achieved by merely stating that the manager is not allowed to invest below a 
certain cutoff 01Y , regardless of how it compares to 1
FX 14. The reason is the following: insiders observe both 
realizations x1 and ε1 (the subscript on ε is added to denote a particular realization). Forcing the manager to 
invest above 01Y  (when 
0
1 1
FY X≥ ) leads her to invest in the risky technology if and only if 01 1 1 1y x Yε= + > , i.e. 
0
1 1 1x Y ε> − . Now, in the case where ε1>0 and 
0
1Y  is only slightly larger than 1
FX , 0 01 1 1 1
FY X Yε− < < . For 
0
1 1 1 1[ , ]
Fx Y Xε∈ − , neither shareholders nor bondholders would invest if complete contracting was possible (i.e. 
if outsiders could observe x1) and both are worse off if the covenant forces investment whenever 01 1y Y> , even 
when 01 1
FY X≥ . This problem is solved if the covenant only states that the manager cannot invest below a certain 
cutoff 01Y . If 
0
1 1
FY X≥ , the interdiction of investing in the risky technology below 01Y  is binding (the 
shareholder-aligned manager would prefer to go down to 1
FX  but is prevented from doing so by the bond 
covenants); if 01 1
FY X< , the manager would choose on her own not to invest below 1
FX . This leads us to:  
 
Proposition 2: The optimal covenant is one-sided, specifying that investment in the risky technology is 
forbidden for y1≤Y10. 
 
The extent of residual risk-shifting after this partial contracting is then 0 01 1 1max( , )
FX Y X− =  
0 0 0
1 1 1 1min( , )
FX Y X X− − , and in the sequel we will refer to optimal contracting as the bondholders imposing the 
interdiction to invest whenever their observation y1 falls short of the cutoff 01Y , no matter how the latter 
compares to 1
FX 15. Figure 4 shows the two possible cases, i.e. when contracting helps alleviating the manager's 
suboptimal investment policy and when bondholders cannot reduce the extent of risk-shifting. 
 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
 
                                                           
14 It seems anyway that bond covenants usually do not specify what the manager has to do (e.g. above a certain cutoff) but 
merely state what she cannot do. We are grateful to Yaakov Amihud for pointing this out. 
15 It is still of interest to know under what parameters such a contracting is useful. Since 01 1and 
FX Y  do not admit a closed-
form representation, the particular ρm*  that equates 01 1and FX Y  for a given ρXY will have to be solved for numerically. 
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New agency costs may be created by contracting under those terms. This is the case if 01Y  is very close to 
0
1X  
and ε1<0. In that case, bondholders will rule out investing in the risky technology if 01 1y Y< , i.e. if 
0
1 1 1x Y ε< − . 
However, for 0 01 1 1 1[ , ]x X Y ε∈ − , one should really invest, but the covenant will not allow it. This, however, is 
not a problem: 01Y  tends to 
0
1X  only when ρXY tends to 1 (we'll shortly show that 01 / 0XYY ρ∂ ∂ > ; it should be 
obvious that 0 01 11limXY
Y X
ρ →
= ), in which case σε tends to 0 ( 1
2 2 2 2(1 ) /X XY XYεσ σ ρ ρ= − ). The probability of a 
realization ε1 such that 0 01 1 1X Y ε< − , 
0 0
1 1(( ) / )Y X εσΦ − , becomes in turn arbitrarily small.  
 
The two following propositions will be useful shortly, when we analyze how the extent of risk-shifting and the 
yield demanded on corporate bonds can be reduced with optimal contracting 
 
Proposition 3: The benefit from contracting is non-decreasing in the face value of the debt outstanding. 
 
Proof:  if 01 1
FY X≥  for all F∈[0,Ir2], the improvement in terms of X1-region due to contracting is 
0
1 1
FY X− . Since 01 1/ 0 and / 0
FY F X F∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ < , this improvement is strictly increasing in F. 
  if 01 1
FY X< , the extent of residual risk-shifting is 01 1
FX X− , the same as the original one (no 
benefit from contracting). However, as F increases, 1
FX decreases and at some point crosses to 
the left of 01Y  (since 
2
1lim
F
F Ir
X
→
= −∞ ), yielding a positive improvement.  
 
Since the precision of the signal is independent of how much debt the firm has issued16 but risk-shifting becomes 
more severe the larger the amount of debt outstanding, there may be no improvement at all for relatively small 
amounts of debt (Y1 is too noisy an estimate of X1); however, as the proportion of debt in the capital structure 
increases, outsiders think twice before discarding the information y1 (X1F crosses to the left of 01Y ). 
 
Proposition 4: For a given firm/industry characterized by ρm, improvement in risk-shifting is non-
decreasing in ρXY . 
 
                                                           
16 This might not be completely true: larger firms are likely to issue more debt, and at the same time, as seen previously, to 
have stricter disclosure requirements (or to be more closely followed by analysts). The precision of the signal is then 
increasing in the amount of debt issued. The same is true if more covenants are attached as the level of debt increases. We 
decide to ignore this for the time being. 
 21
Proof: 0 01 1 1( ) / / 0
F
XY XYY X Yρ ρ∂ − ∂ = ∂ ∂ >  (proof in Appendix 6). Therefore, if 01 1FY X≥  for a given 
F∈[0,Ir2], the improvement increases with ρXY; if 01 1FY X< , the improvement is independent 
of ρXY, but as ρXY increases, so does 01Y  and at some point it crosses to the right of 1FX , 
yielding a positive improvement. The existence of a unique *XYρ  such that 01 1FY X= comes 
from the facts that 010limXY
Y
ρ →
= −∞  and 0 01 1 11limXY
FY X X
ρ →
= >  (see Appendix 6), combined with 
the Intermediate Value Theorem.  
 
Ill-informed outsiders will be reluctant to contract, well aware that a mediocre y1 may still be followed by a 
decent realization of θ. As Y1 becomes more correlated with X1, outsiders become more able (and therefore more 
willing) to effectively monitor the investment policy of the firm. Section 3.2. (where ρXY=0) can therefore be 
seen as dealing with the case where outsiders choose not to contract, given that it is impossible to improve on the 
managers choice ( 01 1
FY X<  for all ρm). 
 
3.3.2. On the Extent of Residual Risk-Shifting After Optimal Contracting 
We will here characterize the extent of the residual risk-shifting after optimal contracts have been written. The 
first step is to show that the benefit at t=1 from contracting, 01 1max( ,0)
FY X− , is non-increasing in ρm:  
 
Theorem 4: at t=1, the benefit from contracting, i.e. the reduction in the extent of risk-shifting, is non-
increasing in the pattern of resolution of uncertainty ρm. More precisely, for ρXY sufficiently 
large, i.e. for XY XYρ ρ≥ , there exists a unique *mρ  such that 01 1FY X>  for *m mρ ρ<  and 
0
1 1
FY X≤  for *m mρ ρ≥ . The reduction in the extent of risk-shifting is then decreasing on 
*[0, )mρ  and 0 on *[ ,1]mρ . 
 
Proof: see Appendix 6. If XY XYρ ρ< , we set * 0mρ = : no industry benefits from contracting17. 
 
Contracting is more interesting for lower values of ρm since a levered firm operating in a field where uncertainty 
is resolved early does not have an investment policy significantly different from its all-equity equivalent. It 
therefore benefits less, for a fixed level of disclosure requirement ρXY, from contracting than a firm operating in 
a field where uncertainty is resolved later and which will have a tendency to risk-shift more significantly. Hence 
the following corollary: 
 
                                                           
17 The firm becomes opaque and the reader is referred to Section 3.2. 
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Corollary 4: Given a certain strictness of disclosure requirements XY XYρ ρ≥ , if a firm/industry benefits 
from contracting, so will a firm/industry for which uncertainty is resolved only later. 
 
Proof: this comes directly from Theorem 4 and the fact that for XY XYρ ρ≥ , it will be interesting for any firm 
below *mρ  (i.e. for which 01 1FY X> ) to contract. The decreasingness of 01 1FY X−  in ρm over the 
region [0, *mρ ] ensures that on this region, the lower ρm, the larger the reduction in the extent of 
risk-shifting. 
 
Corollary 4 yields a */XY mρ ρ  frontier that will give us the *mρ  cutoff (below which firms benefit from 
contracting, above which contracting is useless) as a function of ρXY. Since *mρ  is shown in Appendix 6 to be 
increasing in ρXY, we get the following corollary as a bonus: 
 
Corollary 4b: The economy as a whole is better off, i.e. more industries benefit from contracting, the higher 
ρXY. 
 
It is pretty intuitive that the stricter the disclosure requirements, the more each firm/industry benefits from 
contracting. However, the preceding corollary also states that an increase in ρXY will bring new industries to 
contract; these are the industries that were just a little bit too mature (ρm too high) to benefit from a disclosure of 
quality ρXY, but who can gain from writing contracts based on information of quality ρXY+∆ρXY. In the limit, 
when ρXY tends to 1 (outsiders know as much as insiders), the optimal cutoff 01X  can be imposed by 
bondholders, leaving no residual agency costs: regardless of the amount of debt outstanding and the industry in 
which it operates, a firm will benefit from contracting. At the opposite end of the spectrum, when ρXY crosses 
XYρ  to the left, no firm will benefit from contracting, no matter how large the amount of debt outstanding and 
regardless of the industry in which it operates. 
 
However, for a given level of disclosure requirement ρXY, we are still left with the equivalent of Theorem 2, 
once optimal contracts have been written: 
 
Theorem 2b: The extent of residual risk-shifting 0 01 1 1max( , )
FX Y X−  is decreasing in the speed of resolution 
of uncertainty ρm. 
 
Proof:   when *m mρ ρ≥ , 01 1( ) / 0F mX X ρ∂ − ∂ <  as proved in Appendix 4; 
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 when *m mρ ρ< , we need to show that 0 01 1( ) / 0mX Y ρ∂ − ∂ < ; since 0 01 11limXYX Yρ →= , it suffices 
to show that 2 01 / 0XY mY ρ ρ∂ ∂ ∂ < , thereby ensuring that 0 01 1/ /m mY Xρ ρ∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂ . This proof is 
very similar to the one in Appendix 418. 
 
Partial contracting will thus mitigate risk-shifting, but will not destroy the monotonicity of the extent of risk-
shifting in the pattern of temporal resolution of uncertainty. Thus all our discussion following Theorem 2 is still 
valid after bondholders contract as well as they can. We illustrate the case where XY XYρ ρ≥  in Figure 5. 
 
[Insert Figure 5 here] 
 
3.3.3. On Corporate Debt Yields After Optimal Contracting 
Our last task is to investigate how bond yields evolve with temporal resolution of uncertainty after bondholders 
impose the optimal investment cutoff 01 1max( , )
FX Y . Bonds are priced as before (since, as noted earlier, ρm, 
which is public knowledge, will be used to price all assets), with the difference that the cutoff 01Y  is substituted 
for 1
FX  whenever it is greater. It is shown in Appendix 7 that: 
 
Theorem 3b: Once optimal contracts have been written, the equilibrium prices of corporate bonds are still 
increasing in ρm, the pattern of temporal resolution of uncertainty. Equivalently, the risk 
premium demanded on corporate bonds is still decreasing in ρm. 
 
As before, this stems from two effects: i) the total firm effect remains, i.e. the manager can carry out a more 
educated investment policy (alternatively, the residual variance of the risky project is lower), the larger ρm; 
bondholders share this benefit with shareholders19 and ii) as ρm increases, the extent of risk-shifting 
0 0
1 1 1max ( , )
FX X Y−  decreases (see Theorem 2b), and bondholders benefit from a lower deviation from the 
socially optimal investment policy. 
 
Finally, bond yields are non-increasing in the strictness of disclosure requirements (see Appendix 7): 
                                                           
18 Since ∂ − ∂( ) /Y X F m10 1 ρ  is negative for *m mρ ρ=  (i.e. when 01 1FY X= ), the residual risk-shifting, 
0 0 0
1 1 1 1min ( , )
FX Y X X− − , is not differentiable in ρm at *m mρ ρ= ; however, the reader should not be worried about non-
differentiability on a set of measure zero. 
19 As noted in footnote 12, firm value is increasing in ρm as long as the cutoff the firm uses for investment is no larger than 
0
1X . Since this is the case for both X1
F and Y10, it is also the case for 01 1max( , )
FX Y  and firm value is still increasing in ρm. 
 24
 
Theorem 5: Bond prices are non-decreasing in the strictness of disclosure requirements ρXY (non-increasing 
in the report noise σε). Equivalently, the risk premium demanded on corporate bonds is non-
increasing in ρXY (non-decreasing in the report noise20). More precisely, bond yields are 
decreasing in ρXY on *[0, )mρ  and independent of ρXY  on *[ ,1]mρ . 
 
Here, there is no total firm value effect: the decrease in bond yields accompanying an increase in ρXY is solely 
due to the fact that the extent of residual risk shifting 0 01 1 1max ( , )
FX X Y−  is decreasing in ρXY whenever 
0
1 1
FY X> , i.e. when *m mρ ρ<  (following Proposition 4). This lower deviation from optimal investment policy 
enables bondholders to demand a lower yield premium. 
 
This feature of our model is consistent with the existing literature on the effect of accounting reports on security 
prices. Most recently, Duffie and Lando (2001) refine the Leland (1994) model of default and allow for 
imperfect information, i.e. outsiders observe only at discrete times a noisy accounting report on the value of 
assets, and survivorship. Their conclusion is that the zero-coupon credit spread is strictly increasing in the 
reporting noise level a (see their Figure 8). In our model, reports could be not only about accounting data, but 
also about the investment opportunity set facing the firm (how encouraging a t=1 marketing survey or a 
prototype test are). Since the quantity that characterizes the noisiness of this report in our model is σε, our 
conclusion is the same as Duffie and Landos one. 
 
It is worth noting that share prices are decreasing in ρXY (see Appendix 7): although an increase in ρXY will 
increase firm value, this benefits bondholders and hurts shareholders, prevented from investing on the region 
0 0
1 1[ , ]Y X . Equityholders rationally anticipate that their manager won't have total freedom to maximize the value 
of their claim and price it down accordingly. Note finally that we constrained ρXY to be the same across 
industries (hence our intuition that varying ρXY will yield intra-industry comparative statics). It would be of 
interest to let ρXY vary across industries. For instance, by positing that 1nXY mρ ρ −=  or, equivalently, nb mρ ρ=  for 
n≥2, we are in effect imposing the restriction that there is more information asymmetry in industries where 
uncertainty is resolved later, which seems to be the intuitive case. We looked at the matter but did not report our 
results, which remain essentially unchanged. 
 
 
 
                                                           
20 or, equivalently, non-decreasing in the amount of asymmetric information. 
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4. Empirical Implications and Evidence 
Our paper establishes that a shareholder-aligned manager will have more of an incentive to deviate from the 
value-maximizing investment policy the later the uncertainty surrounding the firms operations is resolved. 
Rational bondholders will anticipate this behavior and demand larger yield premia on the debt of corporations 
with delayed resolution of uncertainty. Those managers will find it a simple matter to deviate significantly from 
the optimal investment policy; the results of such a deviation would take years to be noticed by creditors, by 
which time the value of the firm might be eroded beyond repair. Potential creditors will shy away from a 
situation they could neither monitor nor control and we would expect the level of debt in such an industry to be 
lower than in industries where uncertainty is resolved earlier (where the extent of risk-shifting is not only lower, 
as we have just proved, but also more effectively monitorable). This is reinforced by our Theorem 1, which 
states that the more delayed the uncertainty is, the larger the variance of distribution of terminal cash flows will 
be, which further decreases the debt capacity of the firm and increases risk premia.  
 
The main problem will be of course to find a good proxy for the speed at which uncertainty is resolved. The 
difficulty here is to single out the effect of earlier or later temporal resolution of uncertainty from other effects: 
firms that have high R&D expenses or low quit ratios, i.e. firms we heuristically perceived as operating in a field 
where uncertainty is resolved later, are also firms 
• that have more intangible assets and therefore larger expected bankruptcy costs (lower recovery 
rate on debt); 
• with more risky operations and hence a larger probability of bankruptcy; 
• the value of which is mainly accounted for by expected future earnings (their current earnings may 
even be negative), and therefore finding themselves in lower tax brackets (or even collecting tax 
loss carryforwards). 
 
All these effects contribute in predicting lower debt ratios and higher bond yields for firms operating in fields 
where uncertainty is resolved later based only on existing theories of bankruptcy costs and tax considerations as 
determinants of capital structures. For instance, our conclusion that firms in a lower ρm field should rely less 
heavily on debt could be merely due to tax effects: progressivity in the tax structure implies that greater volatility 
in taxable income raises the firms expected tax liabilities (see Smith and Stulz (1985)). Firms with later TRU 
(and hence riskier distributions of final cash flows) will have an incentive to reduce the amount of debt in their 
capital structure over the range of progressivity. Proxies related to the pattern of TRU that are used in the 
literature indeed control for other effects as well, such as the importance of growth options in the investment 
opportunity set of a particular firm; they are for instance the amount of R&D and advertising expenses (scaled by 
sales or market value of assets) as well as how job-specific the skills of the workers employed by the firm are. 
The empirical evidence listed along our papers implications is to be taken with this in mind.  
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Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984) regress the debt-to-value ratio on non-debt tax shields, R&D and advertising 
expenses and firm volatility, thereby controlling for the overall volatility of assets as well as for the non debt tax 
shield due to R&D expenses. The coefficient on R&D and advertising expenses is significantly negative (see 
their Table III), as our model predicted (firms that have high R&D expenses are usually firms in a late temporal 
resolution of uncertainty field and should therefore be more reluctant to issuing debt). They also report a strong 
finding of intra-industry similarities in firm leverage ratios and of persistent inter-industry differences in a way 
that supports our model: 54% of the cross-sectional variance in firm leverage ratios can be explained by 
industrial classification, with more variation in mean leverage ratios across industries than there is in firm 
leverage ratio within industries. Industries like Drugs and Cosmetics, Electronics or Petroleum 
Exploration, which we would heuristically characterize as having later temporal resolution of uncertainty, have 
significantly lower debt levels than industries like Steel, Telephone, Electricity and Gas Utilities or 
Airlines, which seem to have earlier temporal resolution of uncertainty (see their Table I; their results are 
robust to the exclusion of regulated industries). A comparable test is carried out by Long and Malitz (1986) who 
look at 545 manufacturing firms, grouped into portfolios in order to hold the operating or business risk (as 
measured by unlevered betas) of all firms constant. The quartile with highest R&D expenses is the one with 
lowest leverage and the one with lowest R&D expenses is the one with highest leverage. The negative 
relationship between R&D (and advertising) expenses and leverage remains when the latter is regressed on the 
former, controlling for the firm systematic and residual risk and non-debt tax shields; these results carry over as 
well for portfolios as for individual firms.  
 
Titman and Wessels (1988) use a factor-analytic technique, linear structural modeling, that mitigates the 
measurement problem encountered when working with proxy variables. They report that firms that are more 
unique tend to have lower debt/equity ratios. They define uniqueness as higher R&D and advertising 
expenses and lower quit ratios (firms that sell products with close substitutes are likely to do less research and 
development since their innovations can be more easily duplicated whereas firms with relatively unique 
products are expected to advertise more and, in general, spend more in promoting and selling their products and 
employ workers with high levels of job-specific human capital who will thus find it costly to leave their 
jobs21). Intuition dictates us that firms that operate in an industry where uncertainty is resolved late are, in a 
Titman and Wessels sense, more unique22 and in that sense our model is supported by their empirical evidence 
(for evidence concerning the Japanese market, see Kester (1986) and Bronte (1982)). 
                                                           
21 p. 5. They also control for the tax deductibility of R&D and some selling expenses. Titman (1984) also finds that firms 
that can potentially impose high costs on their customers, workers and suppliers in the event of liquidation have lower debt 
ratios. This definition corresponds, once more heuristically, to our perception of a late temporal resolution of uncertainty 
pattern. 
22 As, for instance, computer or pharmaceutical firms, whereas firms that operate in a field where uncertainty is resolved 
earlier tend to offer products that are more substitutable and less characteristic of a given firm and to rely less heavily on 
human capital. 
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If firms operating in an environment where uncertainty is resolved late (low ρm) have already decided to take on 
debt (because insiders could not bring enough capital of their own or because the opportunity cost of inside 
funds or outside equity are even higher), we should see more representatives of creditors (bondholders or lending 
banks) sitting on the board of directors and more covenants in the bond contract-- so as to prevent shareholders 
from indulging too much in their risk shifting incentives -- than for firms operating in a higher ρm environment 
(see Theorem 4). Now, since the latter will typically have more risky debt outstanding, tests should control for it 
and investigate whether low ρm firms have more creditors on the board of directors and more debt covenants per 
dollar lent. Another solution to the risk-shifting problem may be to shorten debt maturity for those firms, 
rendering suboptimal investment by a shareholder-aligned manager more difficult. This is also in the best 
interest of the firms with most delayed resolution of uncertainty, since it may be able to refinance on better terms 
at the intermediate date. We therefore expect firms with more delayed resolution of uncertainty to issue shorter 
debt. Barclay and Smith (1995) finds supporting evidence in favor of this hypothesis (see also Stohs and Mauer 
(1996) and Guedes and Opler (1996)). 
 
We finally address here the empirical implication about bond yields: bondholders, rationally anticipating risk-
shifting incentives, will demand a higher yield from a corporation in a low ρm industry than from a corporation 
in a high ρm field (Theorems 3 and 3b). Here, some work has been done, investigating whether the pattern of 
temporal resolution of uncertainty has an effect on bond yields, once the effect of classical determinants has 
been singled out. Reisz and Perlich (1999) design three direct proxies for TRU, based on earnings forecasts and 
realizations. They are i) the time-series correlation between forecasted earnings and realized earnings, ii) the root 
mean square error of forecasts and ii) the dispersion in the earnings forecasts across analysts. These proxies try 
to estimate how much more difficult it is to forecast the long-term than it is to forecast the short term: a lumber 
company, say, will know almost as much about the longer-term as about the short-term, which is certainly not 
true for a company with delayed resolution of uncertainty. Reisz and Perlich (1999) find that indeed TRU still 
has some power in explaining cross-sectional variation in bonds yields once risk is controlled for. A firm in the 
last decile (late resolution) will have to offer up to 15.6 basis points more than a firm in the first decile (early 
resolution), ceteris paribus. Moreover, firms with more delayed resolution of uncertainty will have to offer 
increasingly larger yields the longer the bonds they issue: the maturity premium is monotonic in the pattern of 
TRU. They also find that although TRU is priced by the market, it is ignored by rating agencies in their 
grading process. 
 
All of the above empirical implications should be mitigated when the existing regulation enforces verifiable 
disclosure requirements. In particular, this means that larger firms (or, more generally, firms listed on a stock 
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exchange enforcing stricter disclosure regulations) should display a lower extent of risk-shifting than smaller 
firms and should get away with lower yield premia23.  
 
As pointed out earlier, most of these empirical implications would have been achieved by classical corporate 
finance model based on bankruptcy and tax considerations. Moreover, most of the existing empirical evidence 
use proxies closely related to these factors and to the extent of growth opportunities in the firms investment 
opportunity set. However, this does not undermine the validity of our theoretical model and its empirical 
implications: we come to the same conclusions as existing theories of bankruptcy costs and tax considerations, 
but without even considering these effects, therefore in effect singling out the effect of temporal resolution of 
uncertainty on investment policies and bond yields: we offer but one new element of explanation to the existing 
empirical evidence, to be added to the aforementioned consideration in further studies to acquire a fuller 
understanding of the available empirical evidence. 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
In the tradition of papers dealing with the interactions between product markets and financial decisions, we 
argued that a firms financial decisions cannot be independent of how quickly the uncertainty surrounding the 
firm's operations is resolved. Our papers innovation is to show that firms for which uncertainty will be resolved 
later will suffer far more from the risk-shifting tendencies of a shareholder-aligned manager. As a result, the 
yield premium demanded on corporate bonds will be larger the later the uncertainty is resolved. This is mitigated 
when outsiders contract as well as they can based on the observation of a noisy signal, but the qualitative 
conclusions remain the same. 
 
The fact that firm value and bond prices are larger the earlier the uncertainty is resolved does not, however, 
invalidate Ross (1989) theory of resolution irrelevancy. In our model, the difference in prices is due to the 
anticipation of different managerial behaviors that can lead to different cash flows. In Ross words, changing the 
pattern of temporal resolution of uncertainty alters the no-arbitrage martingale pricing operator (which is 
equivalent to changing the state space spanning). As a result, risk-aversion is not even necessary for the speed of 
resolution of uncertainty to affect security prices. 
 
We abstracted in our model from considering the different benefits of debt (tax deductibility of interest, 
disciplinary and signaling role of debt) as well as agency costs of equity. A more general model should include 
all of these in order to determine a firms optimal capital structure (if it exists at all!). However, these benefits 
and costs cannot be traded off against each other independently of the firms pattern of temporal resolution of 
                                                           
23 With the problem that size may proxy for the liquidity of the firm's bonds as well. 
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uncertainty, upon which the optimal capital structure of the firm will depend. Further work should therefore 
investigate the optimal financing of different projects based on how quickly the uncertainty underlying their cash 
flows is resolved. This encompasses as well the nature of the claims to be used as their maturity: a richer menu 
of contractual forms for outside claims (for instance convertible debt) should be introduced. The model could be 
posited in a dynamic multiperiod framework and would investigate whether there is an optimal timing for raising 
money, in the sense of minimizing ex-ante agency costs as a function of the firms pattern of TRU. Alternatively, 
it could try to explain the cross-sectional differences in dividend policies and add a temporal explanation to 
why mature firms differ markedly in this respect from growth firms.  
 
Another avenue for future research is to investigate how the compensation package offered to the top officers of 
levered corporations should depend on the pattern of resolution of uncertainty surrounding the firm's 
operations24. Two contradicting intuitions are at play here: on the one hand, a manager should be compensated 
based on results. In a firm with more delayed resolution of uncertainty, this means delaying the manager's 
compensation, in the sense that more equity-like components (i.e. bonus, shares, and options) should be used. On 
the other hand, the compensation package should try to disalign the manager to mitigate the monotonic risk-
shifting incentives we have uncovered in this paper (this will be easier in a market with substantial reputation 
costs for repeated suboptimal investment decisions). Hence, future research should not only add an element of 
explanation to the wide differences in managerial compensation across industries, but also suggest a way of 
driving managerial decisions closer to the optimal investment choices as a function of the industry in which the 
firm operates. 
 
                                                           
24 Keeping in mind that the manager may not be shareholder-aligned in the first place. This may be due, for instance, to the 
fact that the executives time horizon is relatively short while the value of the stock is the present value of dividends 
stretching to infinity. 
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Appendix 
 
 
1. Computing the Objective Function and its First and Second Derivatives 
We refer the reader to Epstein and Turnbull's (1980) Appendix 1, p.640, for a reminder on multivariate normal 
distributions. We'll just state the following result: if two scalar random variables X1 and θ are jointly normally 
distributed, then the distribution of θ conditional on X1 is also normal with the following parameters: 
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where ρm stands for the correlation between X1 and θ and σθ and 1Xσ  are the respective standard deviations of θ 
and X1. In the sequel we will write E(θ|X1) for E(θ|X1=x1), although it depends on a particular realization x1. 
Equation (1) can be expressed as: 
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After a change of variable making 
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which can be negative for sufficiently low values of Q and x1 ( 1
1
0
lim xx
Q
B
→−∞
→
= +∞ ). 
Differentiating this once more yields: 
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2. Proof of Lemmas 1 and 2 
The manager of a levered firm compares U(I,ρm,x1,F) with U(0,ρm,x1,F) in deciding whether to invest or not. We 
therefore consider here the quantity ∆U(ρm,x1,F)≡U(I,ρm,x1,F)-U(0,ρm,x1,F). Since 10lim xQ B→ = +∞  for all values of 
x1, 1 20lim ( , , , )mQ U Q x F Ir Fρ→ = −  (note the continuity of U when Q tends to 0: as we noted earlier, if Q=0, 
shareholders are left with Ir2-F after investing everything in riskless Treasury bills and repaying bondholders) 
and 
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NB: conditional on investing in the risky technology following a particular observation x1, 1( )xCΦ  is the t=1 
probability of the final cash flow Iθ exceeding the promised debt payment F, i.e. the probability of solvency 
at t=2: 
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/
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∞
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Differentiating ∆U(ρm,x1,F) with respect to x1 yields: 
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Therefore ∆U(ρm,x1,F) is strictly increasing in x1. Given that 
1
1 2lim ( , , ) 0mx U x F Ir Fρ→−∞ ∆ = − + < , 
1
1lim ( , , )mx U x Fρ→+∞ ∆ = +∞  and the continuity of ∆U(ρm,x1,F) in x1, there is a unique x1-cutoff 1
FX  satisfying 
1( , , ) 0
F
mU X Fρ∆ =  by the Intermediate Value Theorem.  
 
To prove that 01 1
FX X>  for any positive amount of risky debt F, it suffices to show that 1
FX  is decreasing in F. 
Hence any positive value of F will yield a cutoff 1
FX  strictly smaller than 01X , and the larger the amount of debt 
outstanding, the lower the investment cutoff 1
FX  will be. Now, 1
FX  is defined as the value of x1 for which 
∆U(ρm,x1,F)=0. Keeping 1( , , )FmU X Fρ∆  equal to 0, implicit differentiation yields: 
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where 
1
FXC  denotes the expression 1xC taken in x1=X1
F.  
 
 
3. Proof of Theorem 1 
We will prove here that the earlier the temporal resolution of uncertainty (i.e. the larger ρm), the larger the cutoff 
value 01X  (resp. 1
FX ) used by the manager of an all-equity (resp. levered) firm. Following the same argument as 
before, we keep 1( , , )
F
mU X Fρ∆  equal to 0 and use implicit differentiation. Now, since  
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and combining equations (A3) and (A6) we get:  
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 (A7). 
To prove that this expression is positive, it suffices to show that 1 1
FX X<  for all values of F. For that purpose, 
we introduce the quantity *1X  such that 
*
1 1 2( | )E X X rθ = = : 1
*
1 1 2 1( ) /( )X mX X r Xθθ σ ρ σ≡ + − <  since E(θ)>r2. 
Now, 
1 1
*
1 | 2 |( , , , ) / (( ) / )m X XU Q X F Q Ir F Qθ θρ σ ϕ σ∂ ∂ = − (see equation (A1)), which is positive for all Q∈[0,I]. 
Therefore * * *1 1 1 1( , , ) ( , , , ) (0, , , ) 0 ( , , )
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m m m mU X F U I X F U X F U X Fρ ρ ρ ρ∆ ≡ − > ≡ ∆ . The strict increasingness 
of ∆U in X1 ensures that *1 1
FX X> for all F∈[0,Ir2). Hence *1 1 1
FX X X< <  and the expression (A7) becomes 
positive for all F∈[0,Ir2).  
 
It is of interest to say one more word on *1X . It is the cutoff used by a manager who tries to 
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∈
 + − =   (social value of the firm, including the responsibility to face a θ<0) and 
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would therefore invest whenever E(θ|X1)≥r2. Since *1 1
FX X>  for all F∈[0,Ir2), in particular for F=0, the manager 
of our all-equity firm still overinvests compared to the social optimum due to limited liability. 
 
Finally, we can prove, using the same steps as above, that 
1 1 1
2 1/ 2
1 1 1/ ( ) /[ (1 ) ( )]F
F F
X m X XX X X I Cθσ ρ σ σ∂ ∂ = − − Φ , 
which is negative since 1 1
FX X< . This will be useful when we consider outside contracts based on the signal Y1. 
 
 
4. Proof of Theorem 2 
We will prove here that the earlier uncertainty is resolved (i.e. the larger ρm), the lower the extent of risk 
shifting 01 1
FX X− . To show that 01 1( ) / 0
F
mX X ρ∂ − ∂ < , i.e. 01 1/ /Fm mX Xρ ρ∂ ∂ < ∂ ∂  for all F∈[0,Ir2), it suffices to 
prove that 2 1 / 0
F
mX Fρ∂ ∂ ∂ > . 
 
Now, drawing from the results in the previous appendix and differentiating (A7) with respect to F (remembering 
that 
1
FXC  depends on F both directly and through X1
F),  
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
1
2
1
2
2 1/ 2 2
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1
(1 ) ( ) ( )
F F F F F
F F
F X X X X X X
m
m mX X
X
C D C C C CX
F C I Cθ
σ ϕ ϕ
σρ ρ ρ
σ
 
− Φ + Φ −∂  
= −
∂ ∂  
− Φ Φ 
 
where we took the expression for ∂X1F/∂F from (A4) and  
1 1 1
1 1
1
1
1
2 1/ 2 2 1/ 2 2 1/ 2
1
( ) 11 1
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ( )( )
F F F
F
F
F
X X Xm
F
m X m m Xm X
X
C C CXD
F FX I I CI Cθθ θ
ρ
σσ ρ σ ρ σ ρρ
σ
∂ ∂ Φ − ∂ − −
≡ + ⋅ = + = ∂ ∂∂ − − − Φ   Φ
 
Therefore 
1 1 1 1 1 1
1
1
2
2 22
1
3
2 2
( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) 1 ( ) ( )
(1 ) ( )
F F F F F F
F
F m mX X X X X X
m
m m X
X
C C C C C CX
IF Cθ
ρ ϕ ϕ ρ
σρ ρ ρ
σ
     Φ + + − −Φ Φ∂      
=
∂ ∂  
− Φ
 
 
It now suffices to remember that, by definition of 1
FX , 
1 1 1
2 2
2 1/ 2( ) ( ) 0(1 )
F F FX X X
Ir FC C C
I θ
ϕ
σ ρ
−Φ + = >
−
 (see (A2)) to 
see that the expression above is positive.  
 
 
5. Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty and Corporate Debt Yields 
We will here price the bonds of the firm in terms of an arbitrary X1-cutoff ξ for the sake of generality (when 
considering partial contracting, well use an X1-cutoff different from 1
FX ). 
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 As of t=1, if x1<ξ, the manager buys riskless bills and the bond will be worth F at t=2 (since Ir2>F); if x1≥ξ, the 
manager invests in the risky technology and the bond will be worth max[0,min(Iθ,F)] 25 at t=2. So conditional on 
investing in riskless bonds, the t=1 value of the bond is F/r2. Conditional of investing in the risky technology, the 
value of the bond as of t=1, denoted B1(ρm,F,x1), is: 
{ }1 1 1 1 1 1
1
1 1 1 1 1 1
/
1 1 1 1 1
2 / 0
1 |
2
|
2
1( , , | ) ( | ) ( | )
1 ( ) ( | ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
F I
m
F I
x x x X x x
X
x x x x x x
B F x x F dP X I dP X
r
F C IE X A C I A C
r
I
A A A C C C
r
θ
θ
ρ ξ θ θ θ
θ σ ϕ ϕ
σ
ϕ ϕ
∞  
> = + 
  
 	  	= Φ + Φ −Φ + −
  
 
 	= Φ + − Φ −
 
 
 
where 
1 1 1 1
1
1 1
|
|
( | )
/( )x x X x
X
E X xA C F I Cθ
θ
θ
σ
σ
=
= = + >  for all x1; once more, it is obvious from the derivation that 
1
( )xCΦ  is nothing else than the t=1 probability of being solvent and that 1( )xAΦ  is the probability of θ being 
positive, both conditional on investing in the risky technology.  
 
NB: note that the next-to-last line in the expression for B1(ρm,F,x1) tells us that at t=1 bondholders expect 
the firm to be solvent (and to receive F) with probability 
1
( )xCΦ  and believe that with a probability of 
1 1
( ) ( )x xA CΦ −Φ  the firm will not be solvent but still have positive value, in which case they will take 
over, receiving on average IE(θ|X1=x1); the last term is a convexity adjustment. 
 
 So as of t=0, the bond price is equal to: 
1 1 1 1 1 1
1
2 1/ 2
0 1
1 2
1( , , ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )m m x x x x x x
X
XB F F I A A A C C C dP x
r r θ ξ
ξρ ξ σ ρ ϕ ϕ
σ
∞  
−  = Φ + − Φ + − Φ − 	
   	
   
    (A8) 
as stated in the text.  
 
Since the debt has the form of a zero-coupon bond, we define the per period yield premium demanded on the 
debt as 
1 2 0 ( , , )m
F
r r B Fρ ξ -1 (bonds in our model have a maturity of two periods). Proving that this yield 
                                                           
25 Since the return on the risky technology is normally distributed, it can assume an arbitrarily negative value. As stated in the 
text, we consider in that case that the society at large has to bear the consequences of a negative realization of θ (product 
liability suit, environmental catastrophe etc.). However, we can choose the parameters so as to make the probability of a 
negative cash flow, conditional on having invested in the risky technology, 
1
0
1 1 1( | ) ( )
FX
dP X x dP xθ
∞
−∞
  
 =     
   arbitrarily small. 
With our parameters (E(θ)=1.15, σθ=0.6), it is never larger than 2.76% for any value of ρm. 
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premium is decreasing in ρm is therefore equivalent to proving that bond prices are increasing in ρm. Now, from 
(A8), 
( )
( )
( )
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
1 1 1
1
1/ 221 2 0 1
1
1/ 22
1
1/ 22
( , , )
1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
m
m m x x x x x x
m X X m
x x x
m X
m m
m
r r B F XF I A A A C C C dP x
A A A
I dP x A A A
I
θ
ξ
θ ξ ξ ξ
ξ
θ
ρ ξ ξ ξϕ σ ρ ρ ϕ ϕ
ρ σ σ ρ
ϕ ξ
σ ρ ϕ ϕ ξ
ρ ρ
σ ρ
∞
−
∞
 ∂ − ∂
 = − − Φ + − Φ −    ∂ ∂	 

  ∂ Φ + ∂   + − − Φ + ∂ ∂ 
 
∂
− −


1 1 1
11
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )           (A9)x x x X
m m
C C C
dP x C C Cξ ξ ξ
ξ
ϕ ξϕ ϕ ξ
ρ ρ
∞  Φ + ∂   
− Φ + ∂ ∂ 
 

 
where 
2
1
1
1
1
21( )
2
X
X
X
X
e
ξ
σϕ ξ
πσ
 
−
 −
 
 
=  denotes the probability density function of X1 taken in 1x ξ=  and, as before, 
the subscript ξ on A and C means that these expressions are also taken in 1x ξ= . Here, we need to come back to 
our particular case where the cutoff is 1FX  and remember that  
• ( )
1 1 1
1/ 22
21 ( ) ( )F F Fm X X XI C C C Ir Fθσ ρ ϕ − Φ + ≡ −  ; 
• the functions : ( ) ( )f x x x xϕΦ +  and : ( | )g x E X xθ =  are increasing in x; hence 
0
1 1
1 1
0
1 1 1 1
| |
( | ) ( | )
F
F
X X
X X
E X X E X XA A
θ θ
θ θ
σ σ
= =
≡ < ≡  since X1F is no larger than 01X  by Lemma 2 and 
0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1
2
2 1/ 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (1 )
F F FX X X X X X
m
rA A A A A A
θ
ϕ ϕ
σ ρ
Φ + < Φ + ≡
−
; 
• ( )1 1 11 1 1( ) ( ) / /F FX X XX X Xϕ ϕ σ σ= − ; and 1 /F mX ρ∂ ∂ ; 
and the derivative (A9) becomes strictly greater than: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
1
1 1 1 1
1
1
1 1 1 1
1
1 1
11 1
1/ 22 2
1
1/ 22 2
1
1/ 22 1 1
1
1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( )
1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( )
( )
1 ( ) ( ) ( )
F
F
F F
x
m m x x m x m x
mX
x
m m x x m x m x
mX
m m x x
XX X
A
I A A A A dP x
C
I C C C C dP x
X XI C A dP X I
θ
θ
θ θ
σ ρ ρ ρ ϕ ρ
ρ
σ ρ ρ ρ ϕ ρ
ρ
ρ σ ρ ϕ ϕ σ
σ
∞
−
∞
−
∞ ∞
−
∂ 
− − Φ + − − Φ ∂ 
∂ 
+ − Φ + − − Φ ∂ 
−
 = − − − 


 
( )
1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1
1
1/ 22
( ) ( ) ( )
1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
F F
X X
x x
m m C C A A C C A A
X X X X
C A dP x
I a b z a b z z dz I a b z a b z z z dzθ θ
σ σ
ρ σ ρ ϕ ϕ ϕ σ ϕ
∞ ∞
−
− −
 Φ −Φ 
= − + − + − Φ + −Φ +       
 
where we used the expression (A5) for 
1
/x mC ρ∂ ∂ and 1 /x mA ρ∂ ∂  and 
2 1/ 2/ (1 )A ma θθ σ ρ = −  , 
2 1/ 2/ (1 )C A ma a F I θσ ρ = − −  , 
2 1/ 2/(1 )A C m mb b ρ ρ= = −  are all constants and z is a standard normal variate. 
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Using equations (15) and (26) from Carr and Rubinstein (1995) to integrate the above normals and simplifying, 
the above expression is equal to ( )
11 1
1 1( ) ( ) ( ) / 0F F
F
XX XI A C X Xθσ ϕ σ Φ −Φ − >  .  
 
Note that when ρm tends to 1, the manager of a levered firm adopts the same cutoff policy as the manager of an 
all-equity firm. It can be shown that 
1
0 *
1 1 1 1 21 1 1
lim lim lim ( ) /
m m m
F
XX X X X r θρ ρ ρ θ σ σ→ → →= = = + − ) and since Ir2>F, 
1xC tends to infinity for all x1 greater than 1
FX . Hence 
1 1 1
( ) ( )x x xC C CϕΦ + ~ 1xC , 1 1 1( ) ( )x x xA A AϕΦ + ~ 1xA  and  
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
11
| 11
1/ 22 1 1 1
11/ 2 1/ 21 2 2
lim ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( | ) ( | ) /lim 1 ( ) 1
1 1
m F
m F
X x x x x x x
X
F
m
XX m m
I A A A C C C dP x
E X E X F I X XI dP x F
θρ
θρ
θ θ
σ ϕ ϕ
θ θ
σ ρ
σσ ρ σ ρ
∞
→
∞
→
   Φ + − Φ +  	
 
 
     
− −    = − − = −Φ        − −   	  	
 


 
Inserting the result above in equation (A8) yields the result that 0 1 1 21lim ( , , ) /( )m
F
mB F X F r rρ ρ→ = : bond prices are 
continuous in ρm=1. To see this, we just have to remember that when ρm=1, θ is revealed as of t=1 and the 
manager invests in the risky project if and only if this already revealed θ is lager than r2. Since Ir2>F, the firm 
will always be solvent; the promised payment can be discounted at the riskless rate to determine the bond price.  
 
Finally, in much the same way as we did for bond prices, it can be shown that share price as well as the value of 
the claim held (unwillingly) by taxpayers are increasing in ρm: an earlier resolution of uncertainty is Pareto-
improving.  
 
 
6. Mitigating Risk-Shifting through Partial Contracting 
Our first task is to prove Proposition 4, i.e. 01 / 0XYY ρ∂ ∂ > . This is done in much the same way as in Appendix 3 
and we'll go quickly through the proof. We keep 0 0 01 1 1( , ,0) ( , , ,0) (0, , ,0)b m mU Y U I Y U Yρ ρ ρ∆ ≡ −  constant at 0 
(this is the implicit definition of 01Y , using the same notation as earlier), and use total differentiation. Now, 
1 1
2
1 1( , ,0) / ( ) /b m XY y XU y y I Aθρ ρ ρ σ σ∂∆ ∂ = Φ , where 1yA  denotes the expression 11 1 |( | ) / YE Y y θθ σ=  and we used 
the fact that E(θ|Y1=y1) depends on ρXY through both b XY mρ ρ ρ=  and 1 1 /Y X XYσ σ ρ= . Finally, since 
( )
1 1
2 2 2
1 1
3/ 22 2
( )(2 ) /
1
y m XY m XY X m XY
XY m XY
A y Xθ
θ
ρ ρ σ ρ ρ σ ρ ρ θ
ρ σ ρ ρ
∂ − − +
=
∂
−
,  
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1
1 1 1 1
1 1
1
2 2 2 1/ 2 2 2 1/ 21
2 2 2 1/ 2
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( , ,0)
(1 ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
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m XY m XY y y y m XY y
XY XY
m XY y m XY m XY y
X
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θ θ
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ρ ρ
σρ ρ σ ρ ρ ρ ρ ϕ
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−
−
∂∂∆
 = − − Φ + + − Φ ∂ ∂
= − Φ − −
 
and hence 1
1
0
11 1
1
0 0
1 1 1
2 2 1/ 21
1
( , ,0)
( )
2
( , ,0) (1 ) ( )
b
m YXY
b XYXY XY
m XY Y
Xy Y
U y
AY Y X
U y A
y
ρ
ρ ϕρ
ρ ρρ ρρ ρ
σ
=
∂∆ 
− ∂ ∂ −
= = −∂∆∂ 
− Φ∂ 
, which is positive since 
0 0
1 1Y X<  as indicated in the text and 
0
1 1X X<  (see end of Appendix 3, where we introduced
*
1X  and proved that 
*
1 1 1
FX X X< <  for all values of F∈[0,Ir2], in particular F=0). Finally, the increasingness of the cutoff in the 
pattern of TRU and its decreasingness in the variance of the signal (i.e. 
1Xσ  for 
0
1X , 1Yσ  for 
0
1Y ), coupled with 
the fact that b m XY mρ ρ ρ ρ= ≤  and 1 1 1/Y X XY Xσ σ ρ σ= ≥  ensures that 
0 0 *
1 1 10 0 0
lim lim lim
XY m m
Y X X
ρ ρ ρ→ → →
< < = −∞ . It 
should be obvious that 0 01 11limXY
Y X
ρ →
=  for any ρm. 
 
The next step is to prove Theorem 4. The new investment cutoff is 01 1max( , )
FX Y  and the benefit from 
contracting is 01 1max( ,0)
FY X− . Using (A7) mutatis mutandis, we come to the conclusion that 
( )
0
1 1
0
1
0 0 0
1 1 1 1
1/ 22 2
( ) ( )
0
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X Yb
m b m mYm XY
AY Y Y X
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( ) ( )( ) ( )
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    when  .
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F
F
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m mY Xm XY m
X Y X F
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A CY X X Y
A C
A C
Y X
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ϕ ϕσ σ
ρ ρρ ρ ρ
ϕ ϕσ
ρ
∂ − −
= ⋅ − ⋅ +
∂ Φ Φ
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 
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Now, since the function : ( ) / ( )h x x xϕ Φ  is decreasing, it suffices to show that 0
1 1
FY XA C>  to prove the 
negativity of 01 1( ) /
F
mY X ρ∂ − ∂  when 01 1FY X≥ . This proof is omitted here but available upon request from the 
author26. When 01 1
FY X< , the reduction in risk-shifting is zero and therefore still non-increasing in ρm.  
 
Now, when ρXY tends to 1, Y10 tends to X10 and ( ) ( )0 01 1 1 10 0lim limm mF FY X X Xρ ρ→ →− = − = ∞ , while when ρXY is 
arbitrarily small, 01 1
FY X−  is arbitrarily negative for any value of ρm, in particular in the neighborhood of ρm=0. 
                                                          
26 Attention: we stated earlier that 2 1/ 2/[ (1 ) ]C A F I θσ ρ= − − . However, here 01YA  uses σY and ρb=ρmρXY, while 1FXC  uses 
σX and ρm. 
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Since 01 1( ) / 0
F
XYY X ρ∂ − ∂ >  (Proposition 4), there is a critical XYρ  such that ( )01 10lim 0m FY Xρ → − = . Given that 
0
1 1( ) / 0
F
mY X ρ∂ − ∂ <  whenever 01 1FY X≥  (see previous paragraph), this ensures that for XY XYρ ρ≤ , 01Y  is 
never greater than 1
FX  for any ρm. In other words, if 01Y  is not greater than 1FX  at low ρm values, it will not 
either for larger values of ρm.  
 
In the case where XY XYρ ρ>  (i.e. it is not the case that 01 1FY X<  for all ρm), when both ρm and ρXY tend to 1, 
( ) ( )0 01 1 1 11 1
1
lim lim 0
m m
XY
F FY X X X
ρ ρ
ρ
→ →
→
− = − =  and the increasingness of 01Y  in ρXY ensures that there is no ρXY for which 
0
1Y  is consistently greater than 1
FX  (i.e. for all ρm). Since ( )01 10lim 0m FY Xρ → − >  (since XY XYρ ρ> ), 
( )01 11
1
lim 0
m
XY
FY X
ρ
ρ
→
→
− = , 
0
1 1( ) 0
F
XY
Y X
ρ
∂ −
>
∂
 and 01 1( ) / 0
F
mY X ρ∂ − ∂ < , the Intermediate Value Theorem ensures that 
there indeed exists a unique *mρ  such that, for a given ρXY greater than XYρ , 0 *1 1 m for F mY X ρ ρ> <  and 
0 *
1 1 m for  
F
mY X ρ ρ≤ ≥ . For XY XYρ ρ< , well set * 0mρ =  and for ρXY=1, * 1mρ = . The improvement 01 1FY X−  in 
terms of risk-shifting is then decreasing in ρm on *[0, )mρ  and constant (equal to 0) on *[ ,1]mρ . 
 
It can also be shown that this *mρ  is increasing in ρXY: an implicit differentiation at *m mρ ρ=  yields, as 01 1FY X−  
is kept constant at 0: 
*
* 0
1
0
1 1
/
0
( ) /
m m
m XY
F
XY m
Y
Y X ρ ρ
ρ ρ
ρ ρ
=
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= − >∂ ∂ − ∂ 
 
since the numerator is positive as stated in Proposition 4 and the denominator is negative as was just proven. 
Alternatively, since 
1 1
2 2/XY X X ερ σ σ σ= + , *mρ  is decreasing in σε. 
 
 
7. Partial Contracting, TRU and Corporate Debt Yields 
 For a given ρXY, if 01 1FY X≤  (i.e. for all ρm if XY XYρ ρ≤ , for *m mρ ρ≥  otherwise), nothing is changed and we 
refer the reader to Appendix 5 for a proof that bond yields are decreasing in ρm. 
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 if *  and  XY XY m mρ ρ ρ ρ> < , shareholders will invest, on average27, for all 01 1x Y> . This yields a bond price 
similar to the one in (A8) and a first derivative of bond prices with respect to ρm similar to (A9), but with 01Y  in 
lieu of the generic cutoff ξ. The reader should also be aware that in this derivative, 0
1Y
A  denotes 
1 1
0 0 2 1/ 2
1 1 | 1 1( | ) / ( ) / / (1 )X m X mE x Y Y Xθ θ θθ σ θ ρ σ σ σ ρ   = = + − −   , as opposed to Appendix 6, where it denoted 
1 1
0 0 2 1/ 2
1 1 | 1 1( | ) / ( ) / / (1 )Y b Y bE y Y Y Xθ θ θθ σ θ ρ σ σ σ ρ   = = + − −   . Since we consider here the case where 
0
1 1
FY X> , ( )0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1/ 2
2( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) / (1 )F F F mY Y Y X X XC C C C C C Ir F I θϕ ϕ σ ρ Φ + > Φ + = − −   and since 
0 0
1 1Y X< , 
0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1/ 2
2( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) / (1 )mY Y Y X X XA A A A A A r θϕ ϕ σ ρ Φ + < Φ + = −  ; this, coupled with the fact that 
0
1 / 0mY ρ∂ ∂ >  
(see previous Appendix), is enough to show, through the exact same steps as in Appendix 5, that 
( )0 0 11 10 01 2 0 1 1( , , ) / ( ) ( ) ( ) / 0m m XY Yr r B F Y I A C Y Xθρ ρ σ ϕ σ ∂ ∂ > Φ −Φ − >  . Hence bond prices are still increasing in 
ρm after optimal contracting; equivalently, the yield premium demanded is lower the quicker the uncertainty is 
resolved.   
OOOOOO 
It can also be shown that this yield premium is non-increasing in ρXY, the accuracy of the information Y1 
available to outsiders. As before, we will do that through looking at comparative statics involving bond prices: 
 if 01 1
FY X≤  (i.e. *m mρ ρ≥ ), 0 1
( , , )
0;
F
m
XY
B F Xρ
ρ
∂
=
∂
 
 if 01 1
FY X>  (i.e. *m mρ ρ< ), 
( ) 0 0 0 0 0 01 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
0 0 01/ 22 01 2 0 1 1 1 1
1
( , , )
1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )Y Y Y Y Y Ym m X
XY X X XY
r r B F Y Y X YF I C C C A A A Yθ
ρ ϕ σ ρ ϕ ϕ ϕ
ρ σ σ ρ
 ∂ − ∂ = + − Φ + − Φ + 
  ∂ ∂	 

Now, as noted before, 
0 0 0
1 1 12 1/ 2
2(1 ) ( ) ( )
Y Y Y
mI C C C Ir Fθσ ρ ϕ − Φ + > −   since 
0
1 1
FY X>  and 
0 0 0
1 1 12 1/ 2
2(1 ) ( ) ( )
Y Y Y
mI A A A Irθσ ρ ϕ − Φ + <   since 
0 0
1 1Y X< ; this, combined with the positivity of 
0
1 / XYY ρ∂ ∂ , 
yields the desired result: bond yields are decreasing in ρXY on *[0, )mρ  and independent of ρXY on *[ ,1]mρ .  
 
This effect is reinforced by the increasingness of *mρ  in ρXY (see previous Appendix): as the latter increases, 
the region where bond yields are strictly decreasing in ρXY expands. 
 
                                                           
27 As we noted in the text, shareholders will really invest for all realizations of X1 greater than 01 1Y ε− . But since 
bondholders do not observe ε1, they will price securities using E(ε)=0 for ε1. 
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Finally, the price of the equity S0(ρm,F,ξ) can be expressed as the difference between the market value of the 
firm (see footnote 12), also increasing in ρXY, and the price of bonds (A8): 
1 1 1
1
2 1/ 2
0 2 1
1 2
1( , , ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )x x xm m
X
XS F Ir F I C C C dP x
r r θ ξ
ξρ ξ σ ρ ϕ
σ
∞  
−  = − Φ + − Φ + 	
   	
   
  
where the cutoff ξ used is 01 1max( , )FX Y . Now, if 01 1FX Y> , share prices are insensitive to a change in ρXY 
until ρXY is large enough for 01Y  to exceed 1FX , in which case they become sensitive to a further increase in 
ρXY. Then 
[ ] ( ) 0 0 01 1 1 1
1 1
0 0 0 01/ 22 01 2 0 1 1 1 1 1
2 1
( , , ) 1 1 ( ) ( ) ( )Y Y Ym m X
XY X X XY XY
r r S F Y Y X Y YIr F I C C C Yθ
ρ ϕ σ ρ ϕ ϕ
ρ σ σ ρ ρ
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Given that 
0 0 0
1 1 12 1/ 2
2(1 ) ( ) ( )
Y Y Y
mI C C C Ir Fθσ ρ ϕ − Φ + > −   since 
0
1 1
FY X> , this last derivative is negative: as 
ρXY increases, contracting becomes more efficient, triggering a transfer of values from shares to bonds. 
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